Exploring Interdisciplinarity

Today is a good day to blog. Outside the weather is gray, dank, and windy; time to stay close to the Hearth. Even more compelling, I am laying in bed, my dog Sparky at my side, nursing a wicked cold that the man, sitting in front of me on the plane coming back from Hungary, generously bestowed on me. Alternating between conscious and semi-conscious states, I have been day dreaming about the presentation I made in Budapest at the Central European University, entitled Complexity and the University of the Future .

In particular, I have been thinking about how I might extend my analysis by building on the readings that I had assigned for my Wednesday and Thursday classes. These include Michael Storper’s and Andres Rodriguez-Pose’s paper Better Rules or Stronger Communities? On the Social Foundations of Institutional Change and Its Economic Effects ( Economic Geography 82 (1); 1-25, 2006) as well as Chicago University law professor Cass Sustein’s Infotopia (2006).

Just as other organizations must adapt to their rapidly changing complex environments, so too must universities.

My original presentation drew upon evolutionary and complexity theory (draft paper forthcoming). It argued that, just as other organizations must adapt to their changing complex environments, so too must universities. As Rogers 1995, Uzzi 2006; Burt 2005; and Beinhocker 2007 might argue, one way of facing this challenge is to transcend existing university boundaries, both internal as well as external, so as to internalize complexity and thereby generate new, and hopefully more adaptive, ideas. This strategy might be problematic in a university setting, however. For universities adapted so well to the changing environment of the industrial age–which called for bureaucratic hierarchies as well as specialization and the division of labor–that their ivory tower culture and their disciplinary silos might have become locked-in over time. As Douglass North has emphasized, just like network technologies, organizations and institutions experience positive externalities and increasing returns, so they tend to become path dependent.

Sustein’s and Storper’s works raise questions about how such change might take place. Although these authors stem from very different disciplinary backgrounds, they both focus on governance, leading me to ask whether or not university governance structures will facilitate or retard adaptive behavior.

Recall that universities are, to a large extent, self-governed through processes of deliberation. But, according to Sustein, deliberation only works in keeping with democratic theorists’ analyses (such as those of Aristotle, Rawls and Habermas) under very particular circumstances. Specifically, for decision making groups to effectively aggregate diverse sources of information and transform them into good ideas, these bodies must be comprised of an accurate representation of people who are relatively equal in terms of status and power, and who adhere to norms that encourage open discussion and information sharing. When such is not the case, lower status individuals are likely to either be reticent or defer to their superiors. As a result, deliberative outcomes will be narrowly conceived, rash, biased, and polarizing.

One must wonder, then, how decisions will unfold in a university context, where benefits and rewards are allocated to a large extent on the basis of rank in a hierarchy of roles

One must wonder, then, how decisions will unfold in a university context, where benefits and rewards are allocated to a large extent on the basis of rank in a hierarchy of roles. Storper and Rodriguez-Pose suggest one possible way of assuring more positive deliberative outcomes, which might well apply in the case of universities. In their article looking at how societal institutions constrain community-based groups and vice versa, the authors argue that communities and societal institutions are complementary rather than antagonistic. In fact, when well conceived, formal institutions and societal norms can serve to inhibit–if not prevent–the type of co-optation of deliberative bodies by influential and powerful members as described by Sustein in Infotopia. In the university realm, the most powerful, influential actors are likely to be deeply embedded in its established culture, and so favor the status quo. Thus, if adaptation is to be successful, and Storper is correct, change will need to be inspired, not only by pressure from the outside, but also–and as importantly–from leadership at the highest level that formally determines the institutional rules of the game–that is to say, the procedures and processes by and through which university deliberative bodies operate.

Our CCT Program is presently undergoing a process of self reflection. We are actually considering the question of ‘What do we want to look like in the future?” With Storper, Rodriguez-Pose, and Sustein in mind, I will not only be participating actively in this process but also–along with my dog Sparky–be thinking about it from an analytical perspective as well.

On Technorati: Andres Rodriguez, Cass Sustein, deliberation, deliberative bodies, democratic theory, economic geography, Higher Education, Infomedia, Michael Storper, the CCT Program, university governance

Today, election day, everyone is watching for updates on news about the election. I clearly understand. Never before has so much been at stake! Having voted early, my husband, Brock Evans, and I were poised to leave for a trip to Central Europe late yesterday afternoon. However, unintended consequences got in the way! So while others are watching the polls, my focus is targeted on the latest news about open seats on Austrian Airlines.

How, you might ask, did this happen? Well, nursing two martini’s back at home, my Husband described it best to our travel agent, Steve Dalgren:

Hi Steve. By now perhaps john has updated you re the Perils and Peregrinations of Brock and Linda. He was very helpful in your absence, especially after that fiasco when–all early and bright, and packed and ready–I handed in my old expired passport, not my current one (hey, what’s the big deal; they are all the same color aren’t they?)

Still packed and ready to go, we will set out for the airport again this afternoon. Ojala! if all goes well, we will land in Vienna early in the morning, just in time for me to make my meeting at the Austrian Academy Science. I have been honored to have been selected as a member of their Institute for Technology Assessment. Looking over the agenda, and viewing complex topics such as those we use to analyze at the US Office of technology Assessment, I am nostalgic for the old days but at the same time I am very eager to participate in the Austrian venture–keeping the idea alive so to speak.

From Austria we go to Prague where we meet an old friend and ardent environmentalist Maria Hudakova. Working out of Slovakia, she heads an organization called VLK, which is dedicated to preserving wolves and their forest environments. Any wolf lover should check out the site, which is in the process of being translated into English.

From Prague on to Budapest, the final leg of our trip. In Budapest, where I have never been before, we will visit Central European University. This is a great opportunity not only for me, but also the Communication Culture and Technology Program. CEU has a program such as ours, and I will speak there about The Future of the University, a topic that has been on my mind these last few weeks, given the tremendous stresses of the financial crisis.

So much to anticipate; so much excitement! No wonder why we took the wrong passport. But today we have made a check list, checked it off, and now await the airport taxi. If all goes well, I will have much to report in about a week!

On Technorati: Austrian Academy of Science, Austrian Institute for Technology Assessment, Central European University, Culture and Technology Program, Linda Garcia, Maria Hudakova, the Communication, VLK

The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan has had a long and distinguished career in public service, providing economic guidance to both Republican and Democratic Administrations alike.

Nevertheless, this explanation makes me question Greenspan’s–as well as his cohorts’–naiveté. 

And surely, his shock at the economic situation as well as his explanation as to why he failed to anticipate the problems with the market resonated with many other key decision makers: the economy had continued to perform well for forty years. Nevertheless, this explanation makes me question Greenspan’s–as well as his cohorts’– naivete.

Unfortunately, Greenspan’s lack of foresight reveals a major lack of hindsight. Forty years is but a blink of the eye in the course of time. Had Greenspan and others looked at the performance of the economy from the perspective of the longue durée– an approach advocated by the great French historian Fernand Braudel in his book On History (University of Chicago Press, 1980)– he certainly could have fathomed the market crash, even if he were unable to predict it.

One need only consider the insights of Eric Beinhocker, in his recent book, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics. (Harvard Business School Press, 2006) Beinhocker’s evolutionary approach is consistent with Braudel’s notion of the longue durée insofar as he emphasizes the on-going cumulative processes that converge in the course of history to yield discernible patterns over time. Pointing to the collapse of the English economy in 1315, Beinhocker notes, for example:

Depressions, recessions, and inflation are not exclusively modern phenomena: they are patterns that have recurred since the beginning of recorded history. There are other patterns in economics that are equally old, including the long-run growth in wealth per person. . . and the distribution of wealth. . . For these patterns to be so old, they must be the result of causes that are deep in the workings of economics, cases that are independent of the technologies, government policies or business practices of a particular age. (p. 161)

As the market crash makes clear: the time for interdisciplinarity is here!

Today’s understanding of the present market crisis should not, therefore, be attributed solely to the failure of politicians to regulate the market so as to promote not just profits but also the public interest. Academia is also partially at fault. As Geoffry Hodgson has argued, in How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Specification in Social Science (Routledge 2002), understanding the economy as it has evolved over the longue durée requires not just a dialogue among disciplines but also new theoretical approaches that build on a long view of history and, thereby, provides a more realistic, while at the same time more complex, level of analysis. As the market crash makes clear: the time for interdisciplinarity is here!

On Technorati: Alan Greenspan, Beinhocker, complexity, economic crisis, economics, Fernand Braudel, history, Hodgson, the longue duree

During my undergraduate days at Syracuse University, I was fortunate enough to have Dr. Jim Price as my economics professor. A fresh graduate from MIT, and a Keynesian, Dr. Price did not view economics as a dismal science. To the contrary, he saw economics as a mental construct that not only approximated reality, but also–and for that reason–could be used to improve upon it.

he saw economics as a mental construct that not only approximated reality, but also–and for that very reason–could be used to improve upon it.

This idea came as something of a surprise to us, his students. For, although we had grown up in the relatively prosperous post war period, our parents had continually admonished us for overspending, recalling how the roaring twenties had given way–without notice–to the dreadful and enduring days of the Depression. When we asked Dr. Price about depressions, and their likely probability, he told us that we need not worry. Depressions were a thing of the past, he said: Now we have the Phillips Curve!.

asked about depressions, and their likely probability, he told us that we need not worry. Now we have the Phillips Curve!

Over the next few years, my enthusiasm for economics waned, not, however, for lack of interest but rather for lack of math skills. As a result–and much to my regret at the time–I chose to study international relations. To be sure, the subject matter was equally interesting and demanding; but, as compared to economics, the discipline’s problem solving ability and methodological approach seemed to me, at least at the time, to be a little fuzzy.

it was not long after, however, that I began to appreciate the decision I had made. For, in the context of the recession of the seventies, and the subsequent oil shocks, the prescriptions that I had learned in Economics 101 no longer seemed to fit. Although the United States still made economic adjustments according to the mathematically proven Phillips Curve, the results were becoming increasingly problematic. The outcome was not greater stability, as economists had led us to expect. Instead the economy suffered persistent stagflation–that is to say, higher prices and fewer jobs. As the late Jane Jacobs characterized this state of affairs (Cities and the Wealth of Nations, 1984), the United States was suffering from underdevelopment. The answer, according to Jacobs, was to shift our focus away from equilibrium outcomes, and to center our thinking on the problem of wealth creation and growth. Jacobs insisted that understanding cities, and how they generate wealth, was the place to start. A non-economist, who employed the wealth of all the social sciences to make sense of the failing US economy–well, that was enough of an inspiration for me.

Faced with the prospects of an up-coming, serious depression, my students ask me what I think. Unlike Dr. Price, I don’t have recourse to an answer such as the Philips Curve. But perhaps this is fortunate. For although I cannot offer formulaic solutions–which may turn out to be wrong–I can provide something that was unavailable in my day–alternative ways of thinking about the economy. Thus, I can point my students to–among other things–Jochai Benkler’s discussions of cooperative growth strategies, which are designed not only to coordinate production but also to generate positive externalities (The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms) Likewise, I might direct them to Beinhocker’s The Origin of Wealth (2006) for a discussion of the complexity and non-linearity associated with economic interactions. Alternatively, I might suggest that they take a look at Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, (2004) for a far more nuanced perspective on economic behavior.

Thus, as I see it, the situation is far from dismal. In fact, we have a learning/ teaching opportunity here. Experience has shown us that prescribed economic solutions, no matter how elegant, are typically situation specific. They are vulnerable to changes in the larger environment. Thus, in teaching about the economy, we must provide our students, not so much with answers, but rather with a menu of perspectives from which they can draw, when faced with fast-moving, unpredictable change.

On Technorati: Add new tag, Beinhocker, Benkler, Bowles, economic crisis, economics, Jane Jacobs, Phillips Curve

Network technologies have not only served to harmonize the world by fostering economic transactions–as Thomas Friedman argues in his book, The World is Flat (2004); as importantly, these technologies have functioned as media channels, providing a vehicle for promoting a common set of economic ideologies and business practices, which have helped sustain these global transactions. Friedman argues that, in a flat world in which all countries are operating on an equal playing field, the United States must become more competitive by enhancing its own human resources. A good principle, for sure.

However, what Friedman fails to take into account is that a flat world may–on its own account–be unsustainable over the long run!

However, what Friedman fails to take into account is that a flat world may–on its own account–be unsustainable over the long run!

When considering the shape of the world today, it is important to remember that the structure of information flows–and hence ideas and ideology–is anything but flat. To the contrary, it is decidedly asymmetrical. In fact, as Joseph Stiglitz has argued in Globalization and its Discontents (2002), the US, together with its allies in the IMF, and to a lesser extent the World Bank, have acted in a typically hegemonic fashion, employing their dominance of world-wide communication networks (both institutional as well as technological) to create precisely the same flat world that Friedman describes. Characterizing the negative impacts of the IMF’s policies, Stiglitz points out that the greatest mistake the world financial leaders made in response to the 1980 debt crisis was to unquestioningly adhere to their own economic fundamentalism, notwithstanding its failures, and to insist that one size–that is to say the Washington Consensus–fits all.

the greatest mistake the world financial leaders made… was to insist that one size–that is to say, the Washington Consensus–fits all.

Like Stiglitz, the evolutionary economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson takes issue with the notion that capitalist systems will converge. Pointing to the stickiness of cultural aspects of economic behavior (which he defines as the impurity principle), Hodgson argues that diversity in the global economy is likely to persist (Hodgson et al, 2001, chapter five). In fact, as he contends, just as in the biological world, such variation is essential for survival. For, if, as Friedman suggests, the world is really flat, where can we look for alternative, adaptive strategies in the event of major economic shocks and upheavals in our environment.

For if, as Friedman suggests, the world is really flat, where can we look for alternative, adaptive strategies in the event of major economic shocks and upheavals in our environment.

The rapid spread of the global financial crisis, from one nation to the next, provides one illustration of some of the dangers inherent in an increasingly flat world. Of course, it is still far too early to anticipate how extensive the damage will be. However, the crisis itself provides essential and long-needed feedback about the dangers of pursuing a singular approach, especially if it is wrong. As the leaders of the world meet to develop strategies to address the present financial crisis, the mistakes of the 1980’s debt crisis should not be repeated. All voices need to be heard, and a variety of approaches (insofar as they are congruent with one another) should be tolerated.

On Technorati: evolutionary economics, Geoffrey Hodgson, global economic crisis, Joseph Stiglitz, The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman, Washington Consensus

Last weekend, instead of posting a blog, I attended the annual meeting of TPRC (formerly known as the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), which was held at George Mason University Law Center.  TPRC has a long and distinguished history. The first such conference was held in November 1972, and its participants included federal employees from the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Defense, as well as 15 academics, 13 of whom were economists, 2 lawyers (Owen 2004: 351).

Relatively speaking, I am an old-timer at TPRC, having attended my first meeting in the mid-eighties. During that time, I have witnessed the Conference expand not only in terms of the number of participants who attend, but also with respect to their backgrounds and the types of issues being addressed.

. . .I have witnessed the Conference expand not only in terms of the number of participants who attend , but also with respect to their backgrounds and the types of issues being addressed.

Taking these changes into account the conference name was changed to the Research Conference on Communication, Information, and Internet Policy.

This transformation was not always easy, however. Having become fast friends, who take great pleasure not only in each others’ company but also in a common body of scholarship, participants have tended to reinforce one another, quibbling only at the margins, and confining the agenda to familiar, well honed issues and tested methodologies. Of course, new ideas and interests have been introduced, but not without substantial resistance.

The case I recall most vividly was the session in which Bob Kahn, grandfather of the Internet, laid out his vision of the future–a virtual library that would house information accessible to everyone.

The audience was skeptical to say the least. “Who will pay for it–the government,” someone asked? When Kahn said the Department of Defense, everyone snickered. Some attendees actually walked out. I was totally embarrassed. But Kahn was undaunted, not to say prescient. Several years later, the Internet–and the wide range of social, economic, and political issues associated with it–have come to the fore at TPRC, the subject of much research and debate.

The TPRC gathering held last weekend ushered in another breath of fresh air, but this time–perhaps due to the financial crisis–participants appeared much more receptive to the new ideas making their debut. The discussion began on Friday, the first day of the conference, when Rob Atkinson, President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, called for a new ‘innovation economics,’ which takes into account the complex nature of the economy. Jonathan Cave, from the Business School at Warwick University in the UK, expanded on Atkinson’s call for action, laying out the requirements for studying the new, complex economy. His presentation, which was awe inspiring, was echoed throughout the day in conversations in the halls and over drinks and dinner. As well, it provided a back drop for the next day’s session, entitled Telecommunications as a Complex, Adaptive System. Perhaps it is understandable, given the nature of the topic, that most of the speakers at this session were relatively new to TPRC. They included, Richard Whitt from Google Inc.; Stephen Schultze, from MIT; Pierre D Vries, from the University of Washington; and my co-author Ellen Surles, also from CCTP at Georgetown. All of us endorsed the idea that telecommunications in particular, and communications policy in general, needed to be addressed through a lens of complexity.

The paper that Ellen and I delivered in this panel– The Rise and Fall of Media Ownership Issues: A Network Perspective of the Policy Field–was in keeping with the theme of complexity. First, it employed complexity theory and social network analysis to illustrate how issues related to media ownership not only arise on the policy agenda, but also are transformed into legislative outcomes–which we characterized as issue cascades. Based our our extensive data set, we showed that issue cascades occur depending on the size and shape of the interface linking actors involved in policy framing, researching policy solutions, and policy making. When these actors overlap insufficiently, they are unable to overcome their ‘cultural/linguistic’ differences and hence cannot reach a common ground. On the other hand, when policy actors are too closely overlapped, their views are redundant, and so they are unable to achieve innovative and productive ideas.

TPRC had become an effective policy interface–just the right size and shape.

Sitting at lunch with our panel participants, as well as others, we continued the conversation. I was struck by the moment! Here we were, policy framers, policy researchers, and policy makers–many who had never spoken before–discussing complexity and the new economy. The conversation could not have been livelier, nor more engaging. TPRC had become an effective policy interface–just the right size and shape.

On Technorati: complex adaptive systems, issue cascades, media ownership, new economy, TPRC

Trying to interpret the political and economic events of the last few weeks, I am reminded of my German classes, in which I struggled to decode German texts that were written in the style of the theatre of the absurd.

Trying to interpret the political and economic events of the last few weeks, I am reminded of my German classes, in which I struggled to decode German texts that were written in the style of the theatre of the absurd. Although many of the first playwriters to work in this genre stemmed from France, and drew upon the existentialist philosophy of Albert Camus, the full range of such authors eventually extended across Europe and the United States. They included playwriters such as Eugene Ionesco, Jean Genet, Edward Albee, and Frederic Durrenmatt, among others.

What constituted them as a group was their shared belief that the world–as it appeared in the wake of the Second World War–was meaningless. Mirroring this perspective, they used the tools of irony and absurdity to make their case theatrically.

While studying German, the absurdist play that impressed me most–and the one that readily comes to mind today–was Romulus the Great, written by the Swiss playwright Frederick Durrenmatt. Described as a non-historic, historical comedy, Romulus der Grosse takes place in the last year of the Roman Empire, when Rome was being overrun by the Ostrogoths–germanic barbarians from the north (476 A.D.). The chief protagonist, the Emperor Romulus, is portrayed as being disinterested and passive in the face of on-coming disaster, preferring to cater to the needs of his chickens rather than the needs of his citizens. Thus, when the leader of the invading troops offered to spare Rome in exchange for the hand of Romulus’ daughter, the Emperor turned down the proposal with alacrity. As his family and colleagues call upon Romulus to take action against the barbarians, he refuses, instead staving the Ostrogoths off with plucked gold leaves from his crown. His wife, daughter, and key members of his entourage flee on a ship, only to die at sea in a raging storm. Romulus, the only survivor, remains in Rome, steadfast in his passivity. How absurd!

Reading this play, I was grateful when my German Professor–whose name, unfortunately, I cannot recall–provided some meaning to this meaninglessness. As he pointed out, all of Durrenmatt’s plays and short stories are based on an anti-hero–that is a person who, while appearing to be a cad, or mad, has some redeeming graces. As interpreted by Durrenmatt, Romulus is just such a person; presenting himself as unpatriotic, unsympathetic, diffident and disinterested throughout most of the play, Romulus is no fool. Believing the Roman Empire to be decadent, corrupt, and out of touch with its changing environment, he looks to his invading neighbors (who wear pants as opposed to robes) to bring modernity to Rome.

Reckoning with recent current events, which are so out of the ordinary, I wonder: Could President Bush be an anti-hero, much like Romulus? If so, what might be his redeeming graces?

Could President Bush be an anit-hero, much like Romulus? If so, what might be his redeeming graces? 

I can assure you, I am no fan of President Bush, often questioning throughout his administration whether he really had his wits about him. But, then again, I do not think he is mentally deficient. What might make him an anti-hero? Well, as the Washington Post reports in its story Bush’s Shifting Ideology: 2nd Term Markedly Different From 1st. (Saturday, September 20, 2008, p. A 1), President Bush–much like Durrenmatt’s Romulus–appears to have recognized the need for change when faced with disastrous and radically different circumstances. Accordingly–absurd as it might seem–contrary to everything that Conservative Republicans hold dear, Bush has proposed an economic rescue plan that entails the government takeover of some of the Nation’s largest and most influential financial firms, at a cost that surpasses the budget of the Pentagon. Moreover, just as Romulus’ cohorts were befuddled by his behavior, and urged him to take a stand on behalf of the empire, many Republicans today are perplexed by the lame duck president’s suddenly taking a stance so at odds with their entrenched ideology. As former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga) characterized the situation:

We have now launched big-government Republicanism. If we saw France do this, Italy do this, we would have thought it was crazy. We would have had pious speaches about the folly of bureaucrats running businesses. (Washington Post, September 20, 2008, p. A10)

Of course, the case of Romulus and Bush are by no means parallel in every detail. Romulus strives to bring about change by destroying the empire; whereas Bush is trying to save the country by challenging the Republican ideology. For me, what makes Bush a potential anti-hero is that, much as in ancient Rome, despite all the incentives to fall back on simplifying ideological cliches, which appeal to the voting public, President Bush–of all people–has finally acknowledged that the world is just not that simple.

Students often ask me how the literature that we read in class relates to the real world that they inhabit. Sometimes it is difficult to explain–so I say, just wait and you will see. For it is only now, some forty years later, that I can appreciate how much my German Professor, and his interpretation of Durrenmatt, has meant to me.

On Technorati: Bush Administration, economic crisis, Frederick Durrenmatt, Republican Party, Romulus the Great, theatre of the absurd

Preparing for my Technology and Society class unveiled an interesting paradox. Looking back from an historical perspective, I was struck by how the term value free science has become a very value ladened word.

looking back from an historical perspective, I was struck by how the term value free science has become a very value ladened word.  

Indeed, this is a curious unintended consequence! For, as the late John M. Jordan documented in Machine-Age Ideology: Social Engineering & American Liberalism (1998), social scientists have, for more than a half century, diligently sought to rid their disciplines of all interpretations and ideological perspectives. As Jordan pointed out, the ultimate goal of these social scientists–which included such luminaries as Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, Walter Lippman, Edwin Gay, and Herbert Croly, among others–was not only to generate new knowledge, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to enhance democratic politics by replacing ideologically oriented politicians with value free experts.

Assessing the political situation today, one can only say that the efforts of these social scientists clearly backfired. For, while most academics remain standoffish, isolated in their ivory towers creating value free science, politicians–such as John McCain and Sarah Palin–have clearly gone over the top in contending that personal values and personalities trump policy analysis. Equally problematic , in terms of differentiating between facts and ideology, are the growing efforts by today’s political leaders to employ the work of scientists to cloak private interests in what is ostensibly value free analysis

politicians–such as John McCain and Sarah Palin–have clearly gone over the top in contending that personal values and personalities trump policy analysis. 

We seem to have come full circle in this regard. For, not without some irony, today’s opponents of the Administration’s performance disdainfully equate the present government’s science with political science. (Statement of Liz Godfrey, policy director for the Endangered Species Coalition. )

The Bush Administration and Congressional Republicans have been especially pernicious in characterizing scientific studies whose conclusions it opposes as junk science, while labeling those with which it agrees as good science. The Department of Interior’s analyses of scientific date calling for protection of endangered species provides one interesting case in point. For example, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, which conducted a survey of Fish and Wildlife Scientists in 2005, Julie MacDonald, a political appointee in the Department of Interior, consistently demanded that the Agency’s scientists alter their findings so as to justify not listing imperiled species such as the Gunnison sage grouse, the California tiger salamander, the roundtail chub, Gunnison’s and White-tailed prairie dogs, and the Mexican garter snake. According to one survey respondent:

I have never before seen the boldness of intimidation demonstrated by a single political appointee. She has modified the behavior of the entire agency. I believe that there should be a thorough investigation of her abuse of discretionary authority and modification of science information provided in the FWS documents. (Noah Greenwald, Seattle-Post Intelligencer December 20, 2006)

Such shenanigans are not limited to one Federal Agency. EPA’s former administrator, Stephen Johnson, was also forced to resign, after the union representing the vast majority of EPA scientists accused him of chronic mendacity, information suppression, and overriding his science advisors in setting new ozone standards (Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility Newsletter, Spring 2008). One symptom of this behavior was the Agency’s decision to close half of its libraries, which housed a good portion of EPA’s earlier scientific studies ( PEER Review Winter 2007, p.9). Equally telling was Vice President Chaney’s role–uncovered by the Washington Post–in overriding scientists’ efforts to restore endangered Salmon in the Klamath Basin by redirecting water from the Klamath River, and the fish, to agribusiness. Only after 90,000 fish had died was this decision reversed by the courts.

When it comes to the realm of politics, value free science may not be the goal to strive for. Perhaps what is needed instead is value added science.

Where do we go from here? When it comes to the realm of politics, value free science may not be the goal to strive for. Perhaps what is needed instead is value added science. Building on Habermas’ model of the public sphere, value added science might be conceived of as the product of a dialogue among diverse actors–hard scientists, social scientists, and value based interests alike. However, instead of taking place in local coffee houses, the discussion might be organized and orchestrated within the government itself. A dialogue that links interests and scientific analyses in an open, transparent fashion, adds tremendous value to the political debate while identifying and enhancing the array of subject matter ripe for scientific investigation. This idea is hardly far-fetched. One need only consider the successes of the National Academy of Science and the former Office of Technology Assessment.

On Technorati: Department of Interior, Endangered Species, EPA, Habermas, John M. Jordan, John McCain, Office of Technology Assessment, public sphere, Sarah Palin, social science, value free science

Back in the Sixties, I studied political science at Columbia University. It was a time of considerable turmoil, especially on university campuses. As students coming into maturity in the late fifties and early sixties, we had been imbued with the idea that, by participating, we could make a difference.

I was encouraged in this regard by my efforts in Berlin, New Hampshire,

we had been imbued with the idea that, by participating, we could make a difference.

campaigning with some of my fellow students on behalf of Senator Eugene McCarthy for president. Devoted to the cause, we went Clean for Gene. We slept on church floors, attended local hockey games, trudged from house to house through the snow, shaved our beards, and even put on brassieres. On returning home, we discovered that President Johnson had decided not to run for another term, based on the election returns in Berlin. Never before had we felt so empowered!

Our confidence in participation became somewhat tenuous, however. In the months that followed, we witnessed the shooting of both Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King; the continuing descent of the US into the Vietnam morass; as well as what we perceived as the great betrayal of the 1968 Democratic Convention. Meanwhile, at Columbia, student participation was intensifying, culminating in Mark Rudd and his followers’ siege of the administration and math buildings. In the chaos of the moment, it was hard to know where to take a stand. So, many of us positioned ourselves in the middle ground, that is to say, in a line encircling the math building, between the police and the protesters, opposing the siege but supporting amnesty. To our dismay, the line broke, as the policemen–some on horseback–charged through the crowd and entered the building. Most disturbing to me was the vision of one of our professors–who taught international social forces–being tossed over a hedge; apprehended by the police; and taken to jail.

Most disturbing to me was the vision of one of our professors–who taught international social forces–being tossed over a hedge; apprehended by the police; and taken to jail.

On campus, the response to this eruption was very mixed. According to rumors circulating around campus, a number of our professors stopped speaking to one another, and–as I came to understand it–they did not do so for several years. These tensions were mirrored in heated disputes among students walking on the quad, engaging in the classroom, and debating over lunch. At issue, first and foremost, was what, in a democracy, should be the limitations on participation. And, as a corollary, what role should academics–in particular–play in political affairs? For those of us who aspired to become future scholars within the academy, the burning question was whether or not it was appropriate, or even possible, to be value free in times such as these.

The answer, according to a majority of social science faculty, was to rise above the fray by turning to positive, quantitative analysis. And so it happened. The Department of Public Law and Government, which had a long tradition of performing institutional analysis, changed its name to the Department of Political Science. Mirroring this change at a more global level was the shift in the American Journal of Political Science from qualitative articles to those based on quantitative analysis. Disgruntled rumblings were stirring in another camp, however, where a revolt against scientism and the rise of post-modernism was beginning to take form.

Of course, debates about the proper role of social science have had a long and continuous history, dating back to the origins of sociology, and August Comte, who vigorously called for a new, positive and empirically based science of human behavior. As Bruce Mazlish points out in his contemplative history, The Uncertain Sciences – Comte raised the flag for positivism in reaction to the horror and chaos of the French Revolution. As Comte argued, to search for the real truth, the social sciences had to rise above ideology by mimicking the physical sciences. The complexities of the Industrial Revolution led to a similar effort to simplify the world, in this case by drawing on the lessons of the machine age to develop a science-base management program. Focused on specialization, standardization, and rationalization, the efforts of these social scientists culminated in the automated work place, Taylorism and–as Max Weber called it–the iron cage of bureaucracy. As might be expected, critics redounded ranging from Marx and Nietsche to Rathenau, Mumford and Ellul.

Once again we are, today, confronted with problems of great uncertainty, brought about by increased interconnectedness and speed of interaction on a global scale. Robert Axelrod calls it a complexity revolution. Much as in the past, the scholarly community–when fraught with uncertainty–has tended to remain aloof by simplifying–dividing itself between those who seek to contain the situation through the use of rhetorical and ideological categories and those who seek to distance themselves through abstraction in numbers. However, as Mazlish reminds us, neither perspective can–on it own–address the complexities of an environment in which human beings and natural phenomenon are continually co-evolving. To encompass these interactions, both approaches–the positive and the interpretive–are essential to understanding. Hence, academics, if they are to be relevant, cannot–as in the past–employ reductionism in whatever form to circumvent difficult situations. Rather, they must work together, looking both from within and from without, to gain a more coherent and decisive perspective.

On Technorati: Bruce Mazlish, Columbia, complexity, Interdisciplinarity, interpretive social science, positivism, the Sixties