ࡱ > Y [ V W X a |k jbjbA]A] b +? +? g @ _ $ ,] ,] ,] P |] d ^ Ȏ _ _ " _ _ _ ` . ` a , T R a ` ` a a _i > _ _ 4 _i _i _i a _ _ 7 _i & t t a _i _i 6 _ M ,] f , , Ȏ ` j _i j 8 _i ) : " : Globalization, Developing Countries, and the Evolution of International Standard Setting Communities of Practice
D. Linda Garcia
Kelsey Burns
Georgetown University
ABSTRACT: Given the high stakes and diverse interests of developing countries, their accession to positions of significance in the global economy raises questions of whether and how the existing standards setting system will be able to adapt to meet our growing need for global standards. To address this question, this paper first conceives of standards setting bodies as communities of practice, which establish rules, norms, meaning, and identity over time based on ongoing interactions and negotiations that accompany participation in a shared enterprise. Building on this framework, the paper then characterizes the present standards setting system. It then describes how it has evolved over time, given changing internal and external circumstances that have generated tensions within the system. Next, the paper looks at three case studies. These show how globalization is serving today to create new tensions in standards setting, driving the demand for standards, generating new players, and creating the basis upon which new players are legitimated and incorporated into the standards community. The first case looks at the integration of European regional standards bodies into the international system. The second studies the rise of consortia and their incorporation into standards setting. The final case is the study of Chinas development of a domestic wireless LAN standard (WAPI) and its implications for future global standards development.
The paper argues that communities of practice, such as standards organizations, typically change and innovate when negotiating with competitors, developing coalitions, and/or incorporating new members. Drawing on historical analysis and case studies, the paper suggests some implications associated with the accession of the most recent newcomersthe developing worldinto the global standard setting arena. In particular, it contends that major discontinuities in the global standards setting arena need not occur to the extent that standards setting bodiesas one might expect communities of practice to doengage and negotiate with developing countries in an ongoing, good-faith fashion. They must take into account all perspectives, so the outcome affords not only continuity but also innovation and adaptation needed in the face of a changing global environment.
Introduction
Globalization presents a number of challenges for standards setting. On the one hand, the demand for standards will likely intensify, given the growing complexity and increased interconnection of the world economy. In fact, in such an economy, the lack of standards might become a limiting factor to continued economic growth. At the same time, a growing supply of global standards is by no means guaranteed. As the economy expands globally, reaching out to all areas of the earth, newcomers, such as developing countries, will need to become engaged and integrated into the global standards system. Given their different political ideologies, cultural philosophies, and diverse stages of economic development, developing countries may have unique standards policy goals that differ greatly from the goals of those who presently govern the system. Thus, given the developing countries high stakes and diverse interests, their accession to positions of significance in the global economy raises the question of whether and how the existing global standards setting system will be able to adapt to meet our growing need for global standards.
Standard Setting and Communities of Practice
Standards are fundamental building blocks of society. For, in any given context, they constitute an agreed upon set of meanings, scripts, and rules that guide behavior and govern relationships. Embodying critical information in a highly compressed and abbreviated format, they greatly simplify the environment. Signaling opportunities and constraining choices, standards allow for cooperation and coordinated behavior to take place.
Consider, for example, the role of language and simple gestures. Based on a common understanding, they provide the shared frame of reference and sense of reality needed for intimate relationships and the establishment of common goals. Similarly, cooperation among individuals engaged in interdependent activities is greatly facilitated when people do not act randomly, or on a trial and error basis, but rather when they conform to shared expectations embodied in socially constructed roles. Likewise, organizations gain greater access to resources as well as reduce their transaction costs, when they adhere to standardized rules and procedures institutionalized in their environments. In so doing, organizations themselves become standardized over time, as today the prevalence of bureaucratic forms and structures clearly attests. In the realm of technology as well, standard specifications and protocols add value to system components by allowing them to interconnect and interoperate in a transparent and seamless fashion.
Notwithstanding standards ubiquity, standards setting does not occur in a vacuum. To the contrary, whether they are dejure or defacto, standards and standards setting processes evolve in a societal context. This context includes the complex set of goals, roles, rules, criteria, assumptions, and expectations about actors behaviors as well as the standards outcomes that are being sought. Embedded in the language, description, vocabulary, artifacts, and repertoires, it allows for a common understanding of the implicit relationships among the parties involved in a shared endeavor. It is within this socially constructed framework of interaction that standards are developed and standards setting bodies interact and evolve over time.
A useful way of capturing the participatory, socially constructed nature of standard setting is to conceive of standard setting bodiesbe they formal organizations, forums, consortia arrangements, or business alliancesas communities of practice. As characterized by Wenger, communities of practice are distinct types of communities in which rules, norms, meaning, and identity are established over time based on the ongoing interactions and negotiations that accompany participation in a shared enterprise. As he explains:
Membership [in a community of practice] is not just a matter of social category, declaring allegiance, belonging to an organization, having a title, or having personal relations with some people. [Nor is a] community of practice defined merely by who knows whom or who talks with whom in a network of interpersonal relations through which information flows. Neither is geographical proximity sufficient to develop a practice. [Rather, communities of practice exist] because they sustain dense relations of mutual engagement organized around what they are there to do.
What allows the characterization of standards setting as a community of practice is the fact that it is in essence an innovation process, in which knowledge and its meaning are generated, negotiated, and shared by participants as they interact to achieve their common goalsthe creation of a standard. As Fomin has described it:
Through working on standards, actors, in an ongoing process of sensemaking, create new meanings of the technology under development. . . . Aside from being tied to structures and its dependence on joint sensemaking, the standardization process can also be conceived as a negotiation process. Only through a process of negotiation and compromise is it possible to create a standard that can be diffused successfully. The negotiated need for a common standard makes it possible to bridge different visions and perceptions and, thus, acts as a mediator between the needs of involved parties.
As in all communities of practice, standards communities reify their activities and outcomes in the form of recognizable artifacts and repertoires that set the stage for, and define, the contextual parameters of their future interactions. According to Wenger, reification is the process of giving form to our experience by producing objects that congeal this experience into thingness. In so doing, we create points of focus around which the negotiation of meaning become organized. In standards setting, these artifacts might include, for example, a communitys bylaws, a formal description of its policies and procedures, standards specifications, technical reports, and requests for comments, to name a few.
When viewed as communities of practice, standards setting bodies are not equivalent to organizations. Rather, communities of practice located within organizations, operating across organizational boundaries, or negotiated among national organizations, can develop standards. What bounds a standards setting community of practice, and sets it apart from other social networks, is the standard itself, which serves as a signpost and point of reference for producers, suppliers, and users alike. Likewise, standards processes need not have longevity; they can exist for decades oras in the case of some consortiathey may achieve their goals in a short but intense period of engagement and interaction. Thus, formal standards bodies, forum, consortia, marketing agreements, etc., all fall within the category of communities of practice.
Vladislave Fomins description of the Pan Nordic (NMT) and Pan-European (GSM) standards can serve to illustrate further the relationship between communities of practice and standards setting activities. As he describes:
The need to create shared meaning and understanding is often so strong that it blurs the traditional boundaries of competition. . . . The meaning of a standard as a boundary object helps [us] to understand how different parties with conflicting interests might come together. The NMT-450 and consequent standards, including the GSM, emerged to a large extent from the work of small engineering oriented work teams operating without formal organization or diplomatic sanctions. The spirit of Nordic cooperation created a fertile soil for establishing communication channels between and within industries in the Nordic region. In contrast to the classic economic theory positing that innovation is driven by competition and market selection, the case of the NMT standard shows that the main impetus for innovation can come from cooperative practice.
Because communities of practice invest heavily in both participation and reification, they are relatively stable to the extent that their mission remains intact. However, they are far from being static. Participation and reification are rarely in sync, so there is considerable room for maneuver. Thus, change takes place over time as community members continue to renegotiate the meaning of their actions and activities through their participation in, and reification, of their practices. Because relationships are so densely linked, changes in the forms of participation and reification can be significant, reverberating through the community in a cascading fashion. Thus, as Wenger describes:
. . . Because meaning is always negotiated anew and because participation and reification are not locked in, there is always an uncertainty, an opening for a slippage of practice. No form of control over the future can be complete and secured. In order to sustain the social coherence of participation and reification within which it can be exercised, control must constantly be reproduced, reasserted, renegotiated in practice.
Changes in a community of practice can also begin via the external environment. Communities of practice do not exist in isolation; they are linked to a much vaster constellation of actors and institutions configured to engage in related activities. A constellation might exist, for example, when communities of practice share historical roots; have related enterprises; serve the same cause or belong to the same organization/institution; face similar conditions; have members in common; share artifacts; are in geographic proximity; have overlapping styles of discourse; and/or compete for the same resources.
Participation and reification serve to link members of a community of practice. So too, do they operate to create channels of communication and the means of engagement across diverse network boundaries throughout a constellation of connected nodes, although at a narrower and less engaged level of intensity. Thus, for example, reified boundary objects, such as a working draft, a draft proposal, a draft standard, agreed upon procedures, or a set of rules, can serve to establish membership in a community of practice, but can also differentiate it from others. To the extent that there is in part sharing of such objects, they can also serve as a means of connecting to other practices, organizations, and/or institutions. Likewise, actors that participate in more than one community can use their multiple memberships to broker relations among diverse communities, translating, coordinating, and aligning perspectives. To the extent that these relationships are ongoing, but not completely self-involved, they can serve to generate boundary-spanning activities that link diverse communities in pursuit of their joint endeavors. Equally important, actors that are at the edge of a community of practice, and who are thus subject to multiple influences, provide input that can serve as the basis for an expanded negotiation.
Significant changes can also take place when newcomers enter a community of practice. Although newcomers may be seeking entry into the community, they bring with them a diverse set of experiences and a unique sense of identity. As Thompson describes:
As newcomers increasingly participate in, and identify with, a [community of practice], they are likely to raise their own profile by challenging social relations and norms previously accepted with the group, or even the wider organization.
Therefore, the successful integration of newcomers into the community entails considerable give and take. On the one hand, newcomers can only gain legitimacy and full membership within the community to the extent that they adhere to the prevailing norms and practices. On the other hand, as carriers of new ideas and important resources, newcomers may be able to align themselves with discontents in the community, thereby overturning the powers that be.
When communities of practice are thus linked to one another and to the institutions that surround them, they are subject to greater perturbations. However, at the same timeand perhaps more importantlythese connections unleash innovative forces that help communities of practice to learn and adapt to the changing demands of their environments.
Standards setting bodies adhere to this open model, which places them within a large constellation of forces. For example, standards and their specifications not only allow various technologies to interconnect, they also provide boundary objects that allow players from multiple and diverse communities to interact and negotiate in pursuit of a common standard. Equally important, because those involved in standards setting simultaneously engage in multiple kinds of standards arenas, they can act either individually or collectively to broker interactions across the entire landscape. Similarly, because many standards bodies often provide alterative modes of engagementsuch as full membership, associated membership or observer statusthey are typically linked to numerous peripheral actors who provide a source of new ideas. At the same time, because communication and information technologies are changing so rapidly, newcomers are constantly entering the scene.
Cargill emphasizes the importance of this kind of flexibility as it relates to standards setting. As he notes:
If the organization or structure of such a committee is rigid and devoted to a singular end, the committee may very well become obsolete as the environment changes around it, since it will be tied to an organizational form ideal for an activity that is no longer valid.
Although changes in communities of practices tend to be continuous, they are rarely uncontested. As we have seen, because identity and participation are linked so closely together, community members invest heavily in maintaining the status quo. Therefore, bringing about change in a community of practice is a major endeavor. As Fox has made clear, exercising power in the context of practice is not a matter of imposing ones will. Rather, it requires a more productive, generative force that works its way through a chain of nodes in an actor network, which may include not only human actors but also inanimate actants, such as technology. Each node requires passage in order for a given outcome to be achieved, and resistance may occur at each point in the chain, so further negotiations and adjustments are typically required. As Fox has described:
If instead of thinking in terms of individuals working and learning with other individuals we think instead of force relations at every point in a network we begin to think about learning in a different way. Network learning is not automatic because no network exists outside of the actions of its independent nodes or actants . . . Learning in this sense is seen as the outcome of a process of local struggle and that struggle is many-faceted involving the self acting upon itself, as well as upon others and upon the material world.
Overcoming resistance in a community of practice requires a form of social translation. In particular, it requires that actors seeking to bring about change successfully create a narrative that not only problematizes a situation, but also provides a solution to it. In so doing, agents must not only generate interest and engage others but also mobilize supporters and allies on behalf of their proposed goals. As Fox notes:
At this stage [the change agents] speak for many, they have become the leaders of the network, they have created a temporary organization in which they have lined up a new chain comprising distinctive links .. . . In the process, they have forced some . . .to link up and persuaded others . . .that their interests are the same . . . . [They] have translated the interests of others into their own and thus gained their . . . willingness to obey their commands.
Not surprisingly, given the above discussion, causing effective translation requires attention to participation and reification. Thus, for example, agents might participate in ways that restructure old relationships and/or create new ones. At the same time, they might also promote specific artifactsas for example, rules and regulations that refocus future negotiations in specific ways. In either case, the result must lead to a more compelling legitimating narrative about the meaning of the community of practice.
As we can see from this account, standards setting bodies represent a prime example of communities of practice. In particular, standards setting can be conceived as a specific form of situated learning and innovation in which progress takes place much as it has been described above. The steps include identifying a problem, proposing solutions, engaging and enrolling members, and amassing allies and supporters on behalf of a common standard. Equally important, there is an intricate networking in standards bodies within a vastly larger constellation of activities, so their members are subject to continual input from their environment, which calls for further participation, negotiation, and reification.
To the degree that standards bodies resemble communities of practice, we can expect them not only to be adaptive over time, but also isomorphic, replicating each other in accordance with their cross boundary ties. At the same time, we might assume that changes will be problematic, requiring the input of multiple perspectives as well as a rewriting of the meaning of what standards setting implies. To ascertain whether these assumptions hold true, as well as their implications for the future, we need to look more concretely at the system of standards setting and at how it has emerged and evolved over time.
The Emergence and Evolution of the Standards Setting System
Serving not only to regulate behavior but also to constitute its very meaning, standards and standards setting bodies are a major source of power in society. For this reason, how and by whom standards are defined is an issue of great import, be it in the context of day-to-day social interactions or in relationship to the architectural framework that defines a technology. Thus, standards setting processes must not only be efficacious, they must also be legitimate. Because of this, the very meaning of standardization and the value attributed to it must clearly resonate with the larger political entity in which related standards apply.
Given the importance of legitimacy to standardization, it is not surprising that, although standards practices clearly resemble one another locally, the meaning attributed to standards, and the overall goals they are intended to achieve, have been traditionally determined at a much higher levelthat of the nation state. Thus, as we shall see, national standards organizations have historically differed in their approach to standardization depending on their national orientation. Furthermore, standards bodies have been historically able to preserve their unique national characteristics. Up until the postwar period at least, their linkages to national and state governments were far stronger and more intense than their linkages to any other communities within their larger constellations.
Understandably, governments have always taken considerable interest in standards setting. Thus, European monarchs established standard weights and measures as a matter of royal prerogative. As Soloman notes: . . .according to The Oxford English Dictionary, the word standard is derived from an early concept of the flag or standard bearer, one might say, the Kings standard.
Equally telling, as early as the seventh century BCE, cities, states, and empires created their own coinage. They did this not only to promote trade through the creation of a standard medium of exchange, but alsoand as importantlyto establish their sovereignty. Likewise, in more recent times, the US Founding Fathers, recognizing the importance of standards, provided in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution the authority for Federal Government to set standard weights and measures.
States also established standards to encourage interstate trade. Accordingly, governments collaborated with one another to standardize weights, measures, and time. They set up the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) as a treaty organization in 1875, with the aim of setting worldwide standards of measurement. Signatories from seventeen nations, including the United States, supported BIPM, which succeeded in reformulating international standards for length and mass.
Over the years, standards continued to grow in importance, providing a means of exerting power, controlling resources, and promoting economic growth. In particular, the emergence of the industrial economy served not only to heighten interest in standards but also to bring new players to the fore. One major impetus for standardization was the increased specialization associated with mass production. With specialization and a deepening of the division of labor, tasks became more interdependent, requiring greater cooperation and information exchange. As noted by Harold Williamson:
Chief among the other elements in the pattern of mass production is the principle of standardization. Stemming from the rudimentary division of labor, standardization involved the continuous pursuit, and progressive realization, of uniformity of the materials, operations and products of industry, which made possible the future division and mechanization of labor.
The relationship between standards and mass production was self-reinforcing. Further advances in precision manufacturing required the development of machine tools and precision gauges, which in turn further drove the need for standards and standard measures.
With the growing demand and increased stakes in standards, communities of practice emerged and evolved around the process of establishing them. Developing their own procedures, communication genres, and social identities during their ongoing, day-to-day interactions, standards setting organizations took on a recognizable life of their own. However, to gain access to necessary resources, they had to respond not only to their own internal dynamics, but also to external developments and events. In negotiating their environments to meet their needs, standards setting communities typically acted with other like-minded similarly engaged groups. In working together, these communities developed over time a set of structural practices unique to their institutional space. Once these practices became taken for granted, they served to recreate and reconstruct the existing order of things.
However, even while standards setting communities had many practices in common, they also differed in accordance with the constraints and opportunities posed by each of their unique institutional environments. One need only consider, for example, the case of the United States. Emerging within the private sector, standards communities developed a voluntary consensus-based approach to the standards setting process. More than anywhere else, these communities of practice were able to act independently, not only from the state, but also from one another.
Countries in Europe pursued alternative paths to standards setting. In contrast with the United States, where the market was large enough to sustain mass production, Europeans were dependent on inter-country trade for large-scale production. From the beginning, therefore, European standards organizations were viewed as part of the industrial infrastructure. European standards organizationsfar more dependent on governments for their support than comparable US organizationsgeared their operations toward trade promotion. Moreover, because European governments generally pursued broad-based industrial policies, they played an activist role in standards development. Despite these similarities, however, European countries differed in their approaches to standards, a fact that reflected each countrys unique political traditions.
In Germany, for example, standardization evolved along corporatist lines based on the belief that standards were intended to serve the public good. Thus, the German national standards policy was neither formulated through competition among standards development organizations, nor imposed by the government. Rather, standards policies evolved through negotiations among economic interests and other key groups in society. However, in contrast to the United States where such groups participated in an ad hoc fashion, in Germany they were organized nationally through peak associations. There was a similar centralization of German standard organizations, which operated through a nationally recognized standards organization, the Deutsche Institute fur Normung (DIN). In exchange for the governments political and financial support, DIN agreed to consider the public interest in all of its work on standards and to give preferential treatment to requests from the Federal Government to carry out work on standards projects which the Federal Government considers in the public interest. Although DIN standards are voluntary, they have a special status, serving as the basis for German regulatory law.
Standardization in France likewise reflected the French political culture and the way in which the state and the private sector had traditionally divided authority. Whereas in the United States standards bodies took advantage of the penchant for voluntary associations, in France the opposite was true. From the time of the French Revolution, voluntary associations in France were not looked upon as the basis for a democratic order. Instead, they were seen as narrow interests impeding public welfare and the good of the nation, which it was believed could only be embodied in the state. Mirroring the dominant role of the state in French politics, standardization emerged in France at the national level, with one stroke from a Presidential decree. The first standards organization, the Association Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR) was founded on June 10, 1918. Unlike the standards bodies in Germany and the United Kingdom, which were private sector organizations, the Association Francaise de Normalisation was attached directly to the Ministries of Commerce, War, Naval Affairs, Public Works, and Labor. Although AFNOR was reconstituted as a private organization in 1926, its status was again changed in 1984, when the French Government declared standardization a public service. The government entrusted AFNOR with responsibility for sourcing, coordinating, approving, and promoting standards training as well as controlling the use of the NP labela trademark that shows compliance with a French national standard. AFNOR was also to represent France at international standards meetings. In addition, in 1984, the government created a High Council for Standardization to oversee the French standardization process. It was convened under the authority of the Ministry for Industry and Research and the chair of AFNOR presided over it.
Standards setting in the United Kingdom most closely resembles that in the United States. This similarity stems from a shared pluralist political culture. However, the British standard system differs from the US system in two major waysthe emphasis on trade and international standards, and the formal relationships existing between the British Standards Institute (BSI) and the national government. BSIs origins can be traced back to 1901, with the establishment of the British Engineering Standards Association as the first national standards organization in Europe. As in the United States, engineering groups provided an important impetus for standards development. Likewise, the procedures for developing standards were almost identical with those in the United States. Granted official status in 1928, the British Engineering Standards Association changed its name three years later to the British Standards Institution (BSI). In accordance with it bylaws, BSI is a voluntary organization with membership open to all interested parties ranging from national industries all the way to professional and consulting engineers.
When these types of nationally oriented standards communities reached out to other groups, they typically did so not directly, but rather via international organizations specifically designed for that purpose. Key among these are: the International Organization of Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The International Organization for Standardization is a voluntary consensus-based organization established in 1946. The aim is promoting international exchange of goods and services, as well as encouraging cooperation in economic, intellectual, technological, and scientific activities. Its very broad jurisdiction covers all industrial standards except for telecommunication and electrical and electronic engineering. Where overlaps of its jurisdictions occur, the ISO works through the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1), which covers standards for information technology systems. Membership in ISO is comprised of national organizations that are deemed to be the most representative of a countrys standards organizations. The technical committees are accountable to the ISO Council and General Assembly and administered on a day-to-day basis by a Central Secretariat located in Geneva.
The IEC, established in 1906, functions much like the ISO, but its jurisdiction is limited to the discipline of electric and electronic fields. As in the case of the ISO, the IEC is a voluntary organization comprised of national members who represent not only the interest of their countries but also those of users, manufacturers, trade, and academic associations. Moreover, similar to the ISO, it employs technical committees to develop standards. However, in contrast to the ISO, in the IEC, each nation is represented in all of the technical committees.
The ITU is a treaty organization whose members are nation states. Instead of producing voluntary standards, it produces international regulatory standards relating to telecommunications. Organized and administered under the auspices of the United Nations, the ITU has a threefold purpose:
to maintain and extend cooperation in the development and use of telecommunications between present members (and to help developing nations)
to promote the development of technical facilities to improve the efficiency of telecommunications
to harmonize the actions of nations to attain these two objectives.
As described by Cargill:
To meet these aims, the ITU allocates radio frequencies, coordinates efforts to eliminate radio interference between nations, helps developing nations use telecommunications technology, advises members on rate setting so that they remain fiscally viable while serving their communities, looks at safety of life issues as they relate to telecommunications, and undertake studies, makes regulations, adopts resolutions, and collects and publishes information on Telecommunication matters.
Although these international organizations provided a venue for producing international standards, their efforts were not truly global in nature. Representation in these bodies was on a national basis, even in some casessuch as in the IECin the standards technical committees. Therefore, individual standards communities of practice were in many ways insulated from the inputs of the full range of actors in the larger standards setting constellation.
The Effects of Globalization
Today, the forces of globalization are altering this situation. Globalization, as defined by David Held and others, is the, widening, deepening, and speeding up of global interconnectedness. The interaction and transaction networks that have existed at a predominately local level are increasingly finding contact with the more spatially expansive global networks that dominate intercontinental and regional interactions, and vice versa. Existing in this global environment, the IT standards setting arena must transform itself to take these complexities into account. As in any community of practice, successful adaptation and transformation requires renegotiation among all the players about the modes of participation, the associated reifications and artifacts, as well as the meaning of the standards practice.
Brought about in part by the advent and wide scale diffusion of information technologies, major structural changes are taking place. One result has been the emergence of a globally networked economy, in which many countries, regions, and city regions within countries interact more often, and more quickly, than ever before. Because these areas are more extensively and densely interconnected, they are much more interdependent. Paralleling these developments, there are today many more actors lobbying on behalf of increasingly diverse interests andmore often than notcompeting agendas. Because these actors are so interdependent, the decisions they make not only generate local effects; they also cause non-linear systemwide outcomes.
Characterizing this situation, Robert Axelrod has argued that, in addition to an Information Revolution, we are witnessing a complexity revolution. As he has noted:
If complexity is often rooted in patterns of interaction among agents, then we might expect systems to exhibit increasingly complex dynamics when changes occur that intensify interaction among the elements. This, of course, is exactly what the Information Revolution is doing; reducing the barriers to interaction among processes that were previously isolated from each other in time or space. Information can be understood as a mediator of interaction. Decreasing the costs of its propagation and storage inherently increases the possibilities for interaction and effects. An Information Revolution is therefore likely to beget a complexity revolution.
The need for standards will loom larger in the future, given the increased complexity and interdependence of the globally networked economy. Just as standards provided the building blocks of the industrial revolution, so too they are essential to reducing information costs, facilitating interactions, and managing complexity. However, whereas in the industrial age, the need was for product standards, in todays complex networked environment, the IT processor platform standardswill be key ADDIN EN.CITE US Office of Technology Assessment19922246US Office of Technology Assessment,Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future Washington D.C.: Government Printing Officehttp://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk1/1992/9220/9220.PDF (US Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). These standards will not only serve their traditional functions of achieving efficiency, promoting coordination, and executing control; equally, if not more importantly, IT platform standards will determine the architecture in which transactions take place.
Despite the growing importance of standardization, achieving interoperable standards to support complex networked interactions and transactions is far more problematic today. Not only are technologies changing at an unprecedented rate, so too are the number and types of forums in which standardization takes place. As Werle notes:
In the last two decades standardization organizations (SOs) in telecommunications and information technology . . . have proliferated. Both the globalization of markets and the blurring of technical boundaries have induced an overlap of the domains of international and regional SOs. At the same time, SOs at the national level are losing significance. Traditional organizations have been restructured andassisted by governmentsnew official SOs have been created at the regional level. Most dramatic, however, has been the growth of private consortiums and forums. Thus, official standard-setting is confronted with an informal sector; the evolution of which indicates some discontent with the traditional organizations and entails an inherent potential of jurisdictional conflict.
Equally problematic, given the enhanced economic value of network standards, and their importance in determining competitive outcomes, trade and intellectual property issues are becoming ever more entwined with standards outcomes. As a result, gaming the system is increasingly common, and new rules and institutions that encompass the global level may be needed. To consider how all of this is happening, and to see what the implications might be for global standards, we look at three case studies.
Globalization and Standards: Three Case Studies
How well are standards communities of practice adapting to these pressures? To what extent have they renegotiated their practices, restructured their artifacts and repertoires, and redefined their meaning to successfully incorporate external inputs and newcomers into the field? The following case studies provide some idea. The first looks at the emergence of European regional standards organizations, the second at the rise of consortia, and the third at the advent of China as a newcomer to the standards field.
The Incorporation of Regional European Standards Organizations into the Global Standards Arena
At the end of the Second World War, European nations were dependent on inter-country trade among regional partners, but were not yet economically or politically integrated. As we have seen, until that time, the European nation-state had been the ultimate authority that spanned the majority of standards activities for any particular nation. Although international standardization formally appeared with the IEC in 1906, the global standards system was not truly challenged until the postwar period with emerging market shifts towards globalization. Europe faced an environment that was no longer suited for individual pursuit of national standards goals. In Helds language, the world was beginning to show signs of widening, deepening, and speeding up global interconnectedness.
The need for increased collaboration among nations in the post-war era led to the renegotiation of the European standards regime, and by extension, challenged the global standards setting community of practice. As is true for all communities of practice, change occurs when a community negotiates with competitors, develops coalitions, and/or incorporates new members. European standards organizations experienced all of these as they progressed towards a regional approach to standardization. The process that led to European regionalization was successful because it articulated a narrative that emphasized rebuilding war torn Europe, and entailed a cooperative process based on give and take.
As Europe began to move towards greater economic and political integration, the need for European standards far exceeded the supply. Three regional European standards bodies were established to meet this need: the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), established in 1961; the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), established in 1973 by the merger of two previous organizations, CENELCOM and CENEL; and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), established in 1988. All three have the authority to write standards for the Commission of the European Union under the New Approach directives that form the basis for harmonization of European standards. Moreover, the three organizations carry out coordination via the Information and Communications Technology Standards Board (ICTSB), which includes representatives from ETSI, CEN, and CENELEC.
CEN and CENELEC resemble each other in organization, membership, and operational procedures, with CEN being the regional equivalent of the ISO, and CENELEC the regional equivalent of the IEC. Set up as nonprofit international associations, they resemble national standards bodies in most respects. Their members currently include twenty-eight national standards organization from European countries, as well as associate members and national workgroups from eight Eastern European and Balkan nations. Membership reflects the collaborative efforts of national standards organizations in Europe that have agreed to adopt regional standards in place of national ones. Operations are carried out in much of the same way that they are in traditional standards organizations. The two organizations are governed by general assemblies that meet annually to establish policy, while day-to-day activities are under the purview of a Secretary General, aided by technical and management committees. Technical committees develop standards made not on the basis of consensus, but rather on the basis of a qualified majority. There are efforts, however, to reach unanimous decisions.
The third European-wide standards body is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Established in March 1988, ETSI was designed not only to help promote harmonization in Europe, but also to accelerate standards development in the telecommunications and information sectors, whose growth was far outstripping the ability of standards organizations to keep pace. Standards are adopted not only on the basis of consensus procedures, but also through a system of weighted voting. Moreover, in contrast to the technical committees in other standards organizations, which are comprised of interested parties, experts chosen for their technical competence staff ETSIs technical committees. When a standard receives a high priority, these technical committees set up expert project teams whose members work on standards development fulltime. Helping to keep it abreast of the needs of the times, ETSIs membership is heterogeneous, including representatives from manufacturers, administrations, public network operators, users, and research bodies. Only European countries receive full membership, but over twenty foreign nations currently hold membership in ETSI under observer status. The established structure of ETSI allows it to span boundaries among global players on an increasingly integrated level.
While these new arrangements clearly put national standards organizations in a subsidiary rolethat of implementing standards decisionsthe arrangements have a certain amount of flexibility built in. Thus, for example, CEN and CENELEC issue three types of documents: European standards (EN), harmonization document (HD) and European pre-standards (ENV). When either regional organization issues an EN, governments must adopt it as a national standard, withdrawing any competing national standards. However, national governments can continue to maintain or issue national standards on a subject pertaining to an HD, so long as it is technically equivalent. ENVs are applied provisionally for a period of no longer than five years, so member governments can maintain conflicting standards until the conversion of an ENV to an EN or HD.
Although the countries of Europe are being successfully integrated into European regional institutions, questions remain as to how such regional institutions are to be integrated into the global standards setting arena. Many view European standards organizations as a political coalition, which can use their block voting power to wield disproportionate power in international standards bodies. The ISO, for example, operates on a one-country, one-vote basis, so each European nation is allowed one vote, which are cast en bloc. Equally problematic from the point of view of some, in 1991 CEN entered into a treaty with ISOthe Vienna Agreement that calls for information exchange and collaboration between the two bodies with the aim of harmonizing European and ISO standards. Questions have arisen as to whether such agreements do not privilege the European Community in the international standards arena. For example, the only way that an American firm might influence a decision in CEN or CENELEC would be to work through the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), whichas the US representativecould take the matter up in ISO.
Cross Boundary Collaboration and the Emergence of Consortia
The global standards setting environment has not only had to incorporate regional standards setting bodies, but also to embrace new communities of standards setting practice that are far less formal, referred to as consortia. The acceptance of consortia into the global scheme of things has by no means been easy. However, as described below, both old-timers and newcomers in the standards community of practice have benefited from the input and collaboration of the other.
The emergence of standards consortia is associated with the fact that formal, voluntary, consensus-based standards processes have not proven well equipped to deal with rapidly advancing information-based networking technologies. Relying on the slow and often arduous process of consensus building, standards bodies have been hard pressed to keep pace with changing technologies. In an effort to make allowances for technology change and to facilitate interoperability among an increasing number of interdependent parties, networking standards have often been incorporated into elaborate reference models and defined in very broad and generic terms. These types of standards are typically referred to as anticipatory standards, because the process of setting the standard anticipates the creation of the product. The problem with these standards, however, is that, even after their formal approval, users still have to implement compatible technologies that meet standards specifications; and products need to be certified as to their compatibility with one another. This process can be so complex and time-consuming that the window of opportunity sometimes closes and new technologies and events overtake those standards.
In the late 1980s, many vendors, discouraged by this lagging process, started to circumvent the traditional standards setting process and develop standards in more focused, interest-based consortia. Included among these, for example, were consortia to develop standards for Switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS), Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) over twisted pair, asynchronous transfer mode (ATM), and frame relay technologies. The major users of consortia included the Corporation for Open Systems (COS), Manufacturing Automation Protocol (MAP), and the Technical Office Protocol (TOP). Operating in a relatively closed environment, these groups greatly simplified the standards process. Unlike traditional standards organizations, consortia are not bound by rules guaranteeing openness and consensus. They generally restrict membership to those willing to pay a significant fee. Because of this exclusivity, these consortia often replicate the dynamics of the market; participants invest in the process because of an anticipated pay off.
Spurred on by the Internet and the growth of the World Wide Web, standards setting consortia proliferated in the 1990s, leading to a major shift in the standards setting field. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), created in 1994, is illustrative in this regard. Established along the lines of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), but on a more formalized basis, the W3C provided a successful model that others soon copied. Eager to become part of the action, technology manufacturers and vendors bypassed traditional standards organization and set up consortia to develop standards that were compatible with the Internet and the World Wide Web. Those that did so were highly successful; whereas the standards developed through the more traditional organizationssuch as ANSIs X12failed to take hold. As described by one observer, a new industry consortium is founded every week. Today, with more than 260 consortia, clearly consortia have become the organization of choice for IT standards developers.
Faced with such competition, traditional standards development organizations have not remained on the sidelines. Recognizing that information technology standards represent a new and unique challenge with respect to both time and the need for interoperability, these organizations sought to streamline their procedures and speed up their processes. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), for example, set up a fast track program for IT standards, whereby ANSI provided accreditation for standards developed in other consortia-like forums. Reforms were also undertaken at the international level in organizations such as ISO, which adopted a Publicly Available Specification Process, allowing standards adopted in other forums to move quickly through the ISO accepted process.
Although both the traditional standards organizations and the consortia have often been in intensesome might say deadlycompetition, they have managed to coexist and benefit from each others experience. As described by Cargill, . . . both groups believed they were in a do or die situation, in which their specific survival depended upon their ability to diminish (but not destroy) the other side whilst retaining hegemony for their set of beliefs. Nonetheless, these organizations seek to work together if not at the management level, at least at the level of their communities of practice. As described by Werle:
If a group in one organization learns that people in another organization are working on a similar problem, they try to concert activities without involving the top executives of their organizations. This is facilitated by personal networks cross-cutting organizational boundaries or by individuals who are members of several SOs (overlapping membership). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, as shown in Table 1 below, the amount of cross-organizational collaboration is considerable. In explaining this situation, Werle suggests that, despite their diverse histories, all standards organizations become isomorphic, so that even when they are at odds with one another there is a strong basis for cooperation.
Table 1
Number of Consortia and SOs Linked to One Another
ANSI 20
ECMA 5
CEN 10
CENELEC 6
ETSI 22
IEC 13
ISO 18
ITU 21
JTC1 8
Source: Werle 2001: 402.
China as a Newcomer to the Global Standards Setting Community of Practice
The most recent perturbation to the standards setting community of practice has been the arrival of China as a newcomer to the field. Although formally joining the ISO over thirty years ago, China has emerged as a demanding newcomer much more recently. As a developing country and peripheral player as defined in terms of the community of practice, Chinas standards goals differ from those of established playersso too has its approach to standards setting and technology policy. What has made China a noteworthy player in the global standards arena is a combination of its large domestic market with its outstanding growth, accumulated technological assets, emphasis on R&D activity, and competitive dynamics afforded by multinational corporations seeking to gain entry into the Chinese market.
With Chinas accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese market opened to the reach of foreign competitors. Alongside the many benefits of trade liberalization, Chinas domestic market became vulnerable to outside influence and powerful competition. One way to shelter such an impact can be to set standards. Many critics of Chinas recent actions to develop standards believe that China is using standards as trade barriers to protect the domestic market. This despite the fact that such a practice is contrary to the spirit of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, to which China is a signatory. It has not been so much Chinas desire to set domestic standards that has attracted criticism from the international community, but more because the standards setting process in China has historically been tremendously opaque and isolated.
Given Chinas economic development policies, its largely isolationist attitude in certain cases of setting domestic standards should come as no surprise. In the mid-1990s, Chinas high-tech firms identified a need to develop uniquely Chinese technical standards, and they called on the Chinese Government for support and assistance. The Government was highly amenable. It had begun to view standards setting as a fundamental mechanism to promote sound industrial policy, and aimed to use domestically derived technical standards as a means to bolster its booming economy.
In a series of meetings hosted by the Ministry of Science in Technology in 2002, Science Minister Xu Guanhua identified four areas that are crucial for China to promote a healthy technology policy. One of those was the need to set domestic standards. Domestic standards were seen in part as a bargaining device. As a scholar from Tsinghua University in Beijing put it, [in order for China] to negotiate with the other side, we need our own cards to play. Standards are Chinas cards. In turn, this perspective led China to pursue a contentious path of advancing several key domestic standards in the information technology sector. Most notable has been the controversial WAPI standard initiative, used here as a case study to show what happens when a newcomer does not participate within the community but still seeks to influence it.
WAPI: How Not To Play
In 2001, a consortium of several IT firms in China began efforts to set a wireless standard aimed to replace the already established and widely used Wi-Fi (wireless fidelity) standard, IEEE 802.11, in the Chinese market. The attempt was anything but successful. What began as an academic exercise grew into a government-sponsored initiative to set a homegrown wireless standard for the Chinese market. The claimed rationale behind the project was that of national securitythe 802.11 standard, already adopted as an ISO standard, had a known security deficiency in its encryption component. Thus, the Chinese standard was not initially an attempt to set an international standard, but instead, claimed to be a domestic response to a sub-optimal standard.
However, as the worlds largest manufacturer and most sought after emerging market, international attention inevitably turned to China when the government decided in 2003 to adopt the wireless protocol as a regulatory standard. The Chinese standard, referred to as WAPI (WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure), was based on an encryption technology that differ[ed] significantly from the internationally recognized standard that U.S. companies ha[d] adopted for global production. By deploying the standard, China hoped to control royalty fees, as well as assure itself that no loopholes existed that might allow foreign entities access to sensitive information via wireless technologies. To further complicate the situation, only a handful of Chinese vendors had the encryption algorithms that supported the standard. Foreign firms interested in selling products in China that used wireless technology would have had to collaborate with the licensed Chinese vendors and presumably relinquish valuable intellectual property in the partnership.
The coalition responsible for drafting the WAPI standard, the Broadband Wireless IP Standards Group (BWIPS), wildly underestimated the Chinese industrys willingness to accept a proprietary and exclusionary standard. But, they also underestimated the international backlash that would arise from Chinas attempt to challenge the incumbent international standard. The Chinese Ministry of the Information Industry (MII) organized BWIPS in 2001. Despite the semblance of Chinese industry and government solidarity, the narrow coalition supporting BWIPS lacked the backing of many of the larger, globally connected Chinese firms: There [was] a small, narrow Chinese coalition of firms arrayed against a huge alliance of multinationals supported by their Chinese corporate partners. As a result, WAPI has had virtually no chance to succeed.
Furthermore, the drafting process of the WAPI standard was tremendously opaque, giving rise to speculations that it had connections to the security detail of the Chinese government. Instead of integrating into the established standards community of practice, the WAPI coalition was a community isolate.
WAPI was scheduled to take affect in June of 2004, delayed from the original deadline of late 2003, as a mandatory standard in China. It was at this point that China really got the rest of the worlds attention. Acting together with other predominant global standards players, the United States prevailed upon China to indefinitely suspend WAPI in April of 2004. Nonetheless, China submitted a new version of WAPI to the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC1 SC6) for approval in November of that year, and was on parallel fast track for approval alongside IEEE 802.11(i), which was an updated and more secure version of Wi-Fi.
In contrast to the development of WAPI, the US-based Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) created the Wi-Fi standard (IEEE 802.11) in an open, non-governmental, transparent forum that spanned more than a decade. The most recent version, 802.11(i), had not only been reviewed independently by cryptographers and over five hundred international engineers from approximately thirty countries, but also screened for interoperability by the vendor community. Representing members and procedures of the global standards setting community of practice, the IEEE created a legitimate and internationally accepted standard. Nevertheless, one notable omission in the process was the fact that, when IEEE first began work towards developing a wireless protocol in 1990, China had not joined the table to discuss its stake in the outcome of the IEEE standard.
In March 2006, the culmination of months of contentious debate ended as the members of the ISO/IEC subcommittee overwhelmingly voted to reject the Chinese technology in favor of the established and more transparent IEEE wireless protocol. The results were not surprising. As previously discussed, newcomers such as China can only gain legitimacy and full membership within a community of practice to the extent that they adhere to the prevailing norms and practices. The highly publicized WAPI case is not indicative of how China has behaved in all standards activities, in all sectors, by all players. It is admittedly a specific case dealing with the high-tech sector with a narrow coalition of interested actors. It is, however, instructive within the larger communities of practice narrative as an example of what does not work when socializing into the group and learning as a newcomer to a community.
China will likely continue to challenge the status quo of the global standards regime as it continues learning, and becomes a legitimate member more fully incorporated into the community. As noted by Kambil, Lee and Long:
Chinas efforts will be most effective when its standards initiatives align with market forces, international standards, and the interests of multi-national coalitions. The governments efforts will be least effective when they conflict with what most customers want within China or in world markets.
Of all the developing countries arising as newcomers, China, which is at forefront of the global economy, is the best suited to spur renegotiation of the current field. Incorporating China into the global standards setting community of practice will undoubtedly change and reinvigorate the system as a whole, but China must first be willing to participate.
Conclusions
As we have seen from the three case studies presented above, some of these changes are already well underway. The Europeans, for example, have carried out a major overhaul of their standards systems, successfully superimposing a regional standards setting infrastructure atop traditional national standards organizations. The ability of the Europeans to manage this transformation was due in no small measure to the fact that these changes were negotiated as well as contextualized within a narrative about European unity that appealed to all the participants. The growing coexistence and collaboration between traditional standards organizations and consortia is equally impressive. Although they have cast themselves as intense competitors, their interactions have led to growth and innovation on both their parts. The traditional SDOs have adopted fast track procedures, while many consortiasuch as the IETF and WC3have adopted the kinds of procedural reforms associated with voluntary organizations.
The case of Chinas integration has yet to come to closure. Based on the WAPI case, China is still in the process of learning how to participate among incumbent players in the international community, and they, likewise, are beginning to recognize China as a legitimate player. The most advantageous scenario in the next several years would be for newcomers such as China and incumbents in the existing global community of practice to negotiate not only the standards outcome butin the processthe meaning of standardization in todays interdependent global economy.
Drawing upon the theory of communities of practices, as well as recent historical experience, the choice before us should be obvious. Standards do not emerge in a vacuum; they are socially constructed. Moreover, they are difficult to impose. Thus, the greater the consensus built up around them, the more useful and widely dispersed standards are likely to be. Hence, standards settingas in any community of practicerequire negotiation, interaction, and engagement, if its ends are to be met. For this reason, newcomers such as China need not be a threat. To the contrary, their participation in the standards setting processif negotiated and executed with a generous degree of give and takecan help the system to grow and innovate so as to keep pace with the rapidly changing global environment. Equally important, Chinaonce fully engagedcan serve as both a model and a mentor to other rising developing countries as they emerge on the global scene. While achieving short-term goalsas in the case of WAPImay be in the interest of specific firms and interested parties, bringing China into the global standards practice is in the long-term interest of the all members of the community.
Copyright is held by D. Linda Garcia and Kelsey Burns.
Prepared for: Chinas Technology Standards Policy Workshop,Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, January 6, 2005.
About the Authors
Linda Garcia is Director of the Communication, Culture and Technology graduate program at Georgetown University. Prior to coming to Georgetown in 1996, she was Project Director and Senior Associate at the Office of Technology Assessment, of the US Congress. There she directed studies on electronic commerce, intellectual property rights, national and international telecommunications policy, standards development, and telecommunication and economic development.
Kelsey Burns recently received a Master of Arts degree from the Communication, Culture and Technology program at Georgetown University. Born and raised in Southern California, Kelsey received her Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from Concordia University, Irvine in 2003. She has traveled and studied throughout Europe, Asia and South America and is currently pursuing a career in the standards field in Washington, D.C.
Endnotes
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Garcia/Burns
Garcia/Burns
Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Stephen Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory, Journal of Management Studies 37, no. 6 (2000): 853-867.
Robert M. Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999).
Edward E. Leamer and Michael Storper, The Economic Geography of the Internet Age, Journal of International Business Studies 32, no. 4 (2001): 641-655.
Donald P. Cushman and Dudley D. Cahn Jr., Communication in Interpersonal Relationships (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985); Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1974).
Roles are the expectations associated with the behavior of someone performing a particular task, or occupying a particular position. When individuals interact to accomplish a task, it can be said that they are in a reciprocal role relationship, and that their behaviors are governed by mutual role expectations. Because role relationships can be aggregated at any level, one can view society as a complex network of systematically interlinked units of reciprocal role relationships. ADDIN EN.CITE Katz197860606Daniel KatzRobert KahnThe Social Psychology of Organizations2nd1978New York, NYJohn Wiley & SonsDavid Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).
As described by Meyer and Rowan, By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environment, and organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner. . . . The organization becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its support and secure its survival. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, eds. Walter Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 50.
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, eds. Walter Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 63-82.
Peter McHugh, Defining the Situation: The Organization of Meaning in Social Interaction (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).
Vladislav Fomin, Equilibrium and Transformation in the Standard Making Process, The Standards Edge, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor, MI: Bolin Communications, 2002), 87-97.
Among the indicators of a community of practice, Wenger cites the following: 1) sustained mutual relationships; 2) shared ways of doing things together; 3) the rapid flow of information and propagation of innovation; 4) absence of introductory preambles; 5) very quick setup of a problem to be discussed; 6) substantial overlap in participants descriptions of who belongs; 7) knowing what others know, what they can do, and how they can contribute to the enterprise; 8) mutually defining identities; 9) the ability to assess `the appropriateness of actions and products; 10) specific tools, representations, and other artifacts; 11) local lore, shared stories, inside jokes, knowing laughter; and jargon and shortcuts to communication as well as the case of producing new ones. Wenger, Communities of Practice, 125.
Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Ibid.
Fomin, Equilibrium and Transformation, 92-93.
Wanda J. Orlikowski and JoAnne Yates, Genre Repertoire: The Structuring of Communicative Practices in Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1994): 541-574; Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Wenger, Communities of Practice, 58.
John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation, Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 40-57; Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory; Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Tineke M. Egyedi and Petra Heijnen Scale of Standards Dynamics: Change in Formal International IT Standards, in The Standards Edge: Future Generations, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor, MI: Sheridan Books, 2005), 298.
Wenger, Communities of Practice, 86.
Fomin, Equilibrium and Transformation, 92-93.
As described by Wenger, Reification is a source of remembering and forgetting by producing forms that persist and change according to their own laws. . . .The persistence of these imprints focuses the future around them. This process is not closed, however. It is open ended in the sense that the shapes of the world change and vanish, and becausenot carrying their own meaningsuch shapes are open to reinterpretation and to multiple interpretations. The persistence of forms inherent in reification is not just a reminder of the past; it can refocus our attention in new ways, surprise us, and force us into new relations with the world. Participation is [also] a source of remembering and forgetting, not only through our memories, but also through the fashioning of identities and thus through out need to recognize ourselves in the past. . . . Of course, this process too is open endednot only because we forget or remember partially, but also because our forms of participation change, our perspectives change, and we experience life in new ways. Wenger, Communities of Practice, 110.
Ibid., 90.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 127.
As Wenger describes, Participation and reification can create connections across boundaries, but they provide distinct channels of connection. The sharing of objects does not imply overlaps in participation, and participation in multiple communities do not necessarily carry their paraphernalia from one to the other. Participation and reification provide very different sorts of connections and present different characteristics, advantages, problems, reflecting their complementarity. Ibid., 110.
According to Wenger: Jurisdiction over various aspects of a boundary object is thus distributed among the constituencies involved, and using an artifact as a boundary object requires processes of coordination and translation between each form of partial jurisdiction. Ibid., 108.
Ibid.
According to Lave and Wenger, the notion of peripheral participation is important because Peripherality suggests that there are multiple, varied, more-or-less engaged and inclusive ways of being located in the fields of participation defined by a community. Peripheral participation is about being located in the social world. Changing locations and perspectives are part of the actors learning trajectories, development identities, and forms of membership. Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Mark Thompson, Structural and Epistemic Parameters in Communities of Practice, Organization Science 16, no. 2 (2005): 151-164.
Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory; Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Mikolaj Jan Piskorski and Bharat Anand, Resources, Power and Prestige: Formation of Structural Inequality in Social Exchange Networks (working paper, Harvard Univeristy, 2002), http://www.people.hbs.edu/mpiskorski/papers/VC-Money.pdf#search=%22resources%2C%20power%20piskorski%22; As described by Fox, On the one hand, [newcomers] need to engage in the existing practice which has developed over time: to understand it, to participate in it, and to become full members of the community in which it exists. On the other hand, they have a stake in its development as they begin to establish their own identity in its future . . . Power conflicts within communities of practice are possible as a result of such dilemmas. Practices evolve partly through the agency of the members of a community as ways of working are changed. What is sacrosanct to one generation may be changed by the next. Different masters may compete with each other in leading the way to the future. Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory, 856.
Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Carl Cargill, Open Systems Standardization: A Business Approach, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR, 1998).
Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory, 860.
Ibid.
Ibid., 862-863.
Wenger, Communities of Practice, 91.
Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); John W. Mohr and Francesca Guerra-Pearson, The Differentiation of Institutional Space: Organizational Forms in the New York Social Welfare Sector, 1888-1917, in Bending the Bars of the Iron Cage: Institutional Dynamics and Processes, eds. Walter Powell and David Jones (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
As Carl Cargill has pointed out, A standards organization usually can be broken down into two components. . . .The largest component is a standards organizations volunteer committees, consisting of representatives of the discipline service, which meet on a regular basis and actually write the standards under the auspices of the standards organization. . . . The second part of the standards groups is the administrative section. . . . This function usually falls under the purview of a group known as the Secretariat (the term has remarkably consistent usage across all standards organizations), which acts as the non-volunteer portion of the standards groups and is charged with ensuring the survival of the entire standards effort for the organization. Carl Cargill, Information Technology Standardization: Theory, Process and Organizations (Cambridge, MA: Digital Press, 1989).
As Werle describes with respect to technical standards: Technical standards are never purely technical. They can cloak commercial interests, political preferences, moral evaluations, etc. at the same time that these underlying interests and choices are brought to bear. Raymund Werle and Eric J. Iversen, Promoting Legitimacy in Technical Standardization, Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 2, no. 1 (March 2006): 23.
Legitimacy can be defined as a generalized perception or assumption that the actors of an entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, Academy of Management Journal 20, no.3 (1995): 574; Werle and Iversen, Promoting Legitimacy in Technical Standards.
R. Soloman, New Paradigms for Future Standards (Cambridge, MA: Research Lab of Electronics, MIT, 1989): 1-2.
Donald B. Woodward and Marc A. Rose, A Primer of Money (New York: McGraw Hill, 1935).
Harold Francis Williamson, The Growth of the American Economy, 2nd ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), 722.
Of particular importance was the vernier caliper, which was first made in the United States in 1851. Inexpensive and capable of reading to thousandths of an inch, the new caliper permitted ordinary machinistswhether they were gunsmiths, watchmakers, or sewing machine manufacturersto develop precision, interoperable parts. C. M. Green, Light Manufacturing and the Beginning of Precision Manufacture, in The Growth of the American Economy, ed. Harold Williamson (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951), 201.
D. Linda Garcia, Bethany Leickly, and Scott Willey, Public and Private Interests in Standard Setting: Conflict or Convergence, in The Standards Edge: Future Generations, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor, MI: Sheridan Books, 2005), 117-139.
Standards setting communities are subject in isolation to entropy. They are not only enmeshed in a broad range of societal networks; they are also deeply embedded in a shared and all-encompassing institutional environment. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, The American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481-510; It is the prevailing set of institutional arrangementsboth formal and informalthat provides the incentive structure and the rules of the game by which they act. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets; Harrison C. White, Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of Production (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
Mass production and the demand for standardized, interoperable parts was especially prominent in the United States where the economic conditions for large-scale production were ripe. In no other country was there a geographic market large enough to absorb the output of a single standardized commodity or stable enough to sustain continued large-scale production. Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Nor was there anywhere else a labor or consumer market equivalent to that in the United States, which could take advantage of an ever-expanding volume of mass-produced capital and consumer goods.
As noted by Cargill, . . . each major country has special requirements or expectations that mirror the needs of the country. Whether these needs are rooted in the national ethic, the national economic welfare, or simply a desired to be different is immaterial. At times, the country will use a standard organization to justify the setting of these regulations. Cargill, Information Technology Standardization, 83.
Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
This is typical of German government-industry relations in general. As described by Paterson and Whitson: . . . there appears to be in the German case a sense of organic unity, a commitment to action in the national interest which extends the interests of individuals or particular groups. The importance of this orientation is that it allows the state to facilitate action by other actors which promotes long term national goals. William Paterson and Colin Whitston, Government-Industry Relations in the Chemical Industry: An Anglo-German Comparison in Comparative Government-Industry Relations, eds. Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
Jack Veugelers and Michele Lamont, France: Alternative Locations for Public Debate, in Between States and Markets: The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective, ed. Robert Wuthnow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); This perspective can be clearly seen, for example, in a speech made to the French Constituent Assembly in 1791, which called for an end to all voluntary associations: It should not be permissible for citizens of certain occupations to meet together in pretense of their pretended common interests. There must be no more guilds in the state but only the individual interests of each citizen and the general interest. No one shall be allowed to arouse in any citizen any kind of intermediate interests and to separate him from the public weal through the medium of corporate interests. Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).
J. Hayward, Mobilization of Private Interests in the Service of Public Ambitions: The Salient Element in the Dual French Policy Style, in Policy Styles in Western Europe, ed. Jeremy Richardson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); J. Hayward, Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1983).
Cargill, Open Systems Standardization.
Ibid.
Ibid., 139-141.
Ibid., 143.
David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999).
Allen J. Scott, Regions and the World Economy: The Coming Shape of Global Production, Competition, and Political Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complexity.
Product standards embody information. By specifying the characteristics of a product, they allow for product identification, interoperability, and quality control. In contrast, process standards facilitate and support socioeconomic transactions and interactions. They define roles and relationships, establish the rules for interpreting behavior, and specify the way in which a particular procedure or process is executed. Process standards are inherent in all social interactions. US Office of Technology Assessment, Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).
Garcia, Leickly, and Willey, Public and Private Interests in Standard Setting.
As Purcell notes, according to the ICC, there are more than 500,000 standards extant today, and it requires approximately 41.5 billion a year to maintain these standards and develop new ones. Donald Purcell, Strategic Standard Setting on the Global Stage: Weighing in on the Development of International Standards, in The Standards Edge: Future Generation, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor: Sheridan Books, 2005), 147-153.
Raymund Werle, Institutional Aspects of StandardizationJurisdictional Conflicts and the Choice of Standardization Organizations, Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 3 (2001): 392.
According to the OECDs estimates, in 1999, 80% of world [product] trade was related to standards. Purcell, Strategic Standard Setting on the Global Stage, 148.
Werle, Institutional Aspects of Standardization; As Purcell notes, . . .there is no precise definition of an international standard. For example, although the World Trade Organization was created to facilitate and regulate international commerce, and has an entire section of its charter dedicated to resolving international technical (standard) trade barriers, the term international standard is not defined in the WTO agreement. Instead, the WTO defines an international standard to be a standard that meets the following process principles: transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and development dimension. In short, the WTO relies on development process criteria to define an international standard. Purcell, Strategic Standard Setting on the Global Stage, 149.
Roger Rensberger, Rene van de Zande, and Helen Delaney, Standards Setting in the European Union (Gaithersberg, MD: US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1997).
Ibid., 26.
Werle, Institutional Aspects of Standardization, 396.
Votes used to be weighted on a national basis. This voting system was revised in 1991. Now individual member votes are weighted according to their sales, or in the case of administrations, on the basis of their gross domestic products. Exceptions are made when, in voting on a standard, ETSI must be consistent with the rules of Article 148 of the Treaty of Rome and those of CEN and CENELEC.
As of April 2005, ETSI had 498 full members from 36 European countries, 37 observer members (entitled to be full members, but do not wish to be involved in ETSIs technical work), and 102 associate members from 20 non-European countries. Paul Reid, What is ETSI? http://www.etsi.org/about_etsi/30_minutes/documents/sem02-16.ppt.
Ibid., 7.
US Office of Technology Assessment, Global Standards.
Under the Vienna Agreement of 1991, CEN and ISO agreed on the general exchange of information, cooperation on standards drafting between the two organizations, and the adoption of existing international standards as European standards. Rensberger, Zande, and Delaney, Standards Setting in the European Union, 12.
Cargill, Information Technology Standardization.
Martin Weiss and Carl Cargill, Consortia in the Standards Development Process, Journal of the American Society for Information Science 43, no. 8 (1999): 559-565.
Martin C. Libicki, James Schneider, Dave Frelinger, and Anna Slomovic, Scaffolding the New Web: Standards and Standards Policy for the Digital Economy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000).
Carl Cargill, Uncommon Commonality, in The Standards Edge, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor, MI: Bolin Communications, 2002), 29-39; Michael B. Spring and Martin B. Weiss, Financing the Standards Development Process, in Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure ed. Brian Kahin and Janet Abbate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
Cargill, Uncommon Commonality, 33.
Werle, Institutional Aspects of Standardization, 401.
Chinas share of world trade has more than tripled since 1990. Of the US$200 billion in goods that are imported to the US from the region of the Pacific Rim, over 70% comes from China. Craig Harmon and Leslie Downey, RFID: Will China Throw a Monkey Wrench? BusinessWeek Online, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2005/tc20050912_6790.htm.
Richard P. Suttmeier and Yao Xiagkui, China's Post-WTO Technology Policy: Standards, Software, and the Changing Nature of Techno-Nationalism, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report No. 7, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR7.pdf.
The other areas of interest expressed by Xu are R&D spending, human resources (keeping/recruiting intellectual capitol in China), and intellectual property rights. Ibid., 15.
Zhao Huaxin, Technical Standards Updated to Suit WTO, China Daily, April 2, 2004.
China has made efforts at domestic standards setting in the following areas: digital audio standard (AVS) replacing the MPEG format; a domestic microprocessor; enhanced versatile disc (EVD) as a successor to the DVD format; 3G mobile technology; standard for sharing among digital devices (IRGS); a new internet protocol (IPV6); a security standard for wireless devices (WAPI); and, a domestic standard for radio frequency identification tagging (RFID). Suttmeier and Yao, Chinas Post-WTO Technology Policy, 8.
Ibid., 27-28.
Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China's Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, Asia Policy 2 (July 2006): 44. http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP2/AP2_Kennedy.pdf#search=%22%22political%20economy%20of%20standards%20coalitions%22%22.
Ibid., 50.
In Chinas defense, WAPI supporters had only intended for it to be a domestic standard and although there were obvious implications for the international market, China had never participated on an international level in the standards arena before, and was still in the beginning stages of the learning process.
Purcell, Strategic Standard Setting on the Global Stage, 150; A joint letter signed by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Evans, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was sent to Chinas Vice Premieres Wu Yi and Zeng Peiyan, urging them to dissolve WAPI initiatives. Suttmeier and Yao, Chinas Post-WTO Technology Policy, 28.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), IEEE 802.11 Working Group, (2005, Nov. 15, 2005). WAPI Position Paper, 2005-11-15, http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/WAPI/11-05-0967-09-0jtc-wapi-position-paper.ppt.
Mike Clendenin, ISO Rejects Chinas WLAN Standard, EE Times Online, March 12, 2006. http://www.eetimes.com/news/design/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=181502994.
Fox, Communities of Practice, Foucault, and Actor-Network Theory; Wenger, Communities of Practice.
Ajit Kambil, Paul Lee, and Victor Long, Changing China: Will China's Technology Standards Reshape Your Industry? Global Technology, Media, & Telecommunications Industry Group, Deloitte Research, http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/DTT_DR_ChangeChina_July2004.pdf.
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